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Pragmatism, Pragma-Dialectics, and Methodology:  




In this essay, I argue that the pragma-dialectical approach to the analysis of 
argumentative discourse is limited, or could better serve critics, if it provided a 
more defined method for the evaluation of arguments based upon goals, purpos-
es, and consequences. Specifically, I argue current conceptions and applications 
of pragma-dialectical methodology potentially run the risk of amorality in that 
arguments are deemed ‗good‘ as long as they meet the goals of the speaker, re-
gardless of what those goals or purposes might be. In the following segments of 
this essay, I will more clearly and specifically identify and investigate the 
aforementioned ethical deficiencies of the pragma-dialectical method, and out-
line a corrective based on the theories of American pragmatists such as John 
Dewey, William James, and Richard Rorty, that I believe functions to elevate 
the pragma in this particular approach.  
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Introduction 
In the past two decades, significant scholarly attention has centered on the 
pragma-dialectical approach to argument criticism. Borrowing from previous 
scholarship in the fields of linguistics, pragmatics, and logic, pragma-dialectics 
originated in the Netherlands in the early 1980s. Scholars who developed the 
pragma-dialectical methodology subscribed to a purpose-oriented, problem-
solution framework to analyze and criticize argument, rhetoric, and dialectic 
(Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004). Van Eemeren and Houtloss-
er (2000) defined argumentation as a mode of discourse for dispute resolution: 
―In pragma-dialectics argumentation is viewed as a phenomenon of verbal 
communication; it is studied as a mode of discourse characterized by the use of 
language for resolving a dispute‖ (p. 293). Van Rees (2000) defined pragma-
dialectics as both ―embedded in existing controversy‖ and concerned with the 
―resolution of a difference of opinion‖ (p. 119). Similarly, Johnson (2000) ar-
gued that ―informal logic is pragmatic, meaning that it is concerned with the 
uses of argument‖ (p. 256). While informal logicians may deny the existence of 
any concrete, formalized rules to evaluate arguments, they advocate for a me-
thodology that judges the impact of arguments by how successful they are at 
resolving disputes. Thus, the pragma-dialectical approach, at least in theory, 
provides critics with a methodology to evaluate how well particular arguments 
fulfill their rhetorical purposes (the pragma) and whether or not they comply 
with the guidelines for fair dialectical processes (the dialectics). 
Similarly, other scholars who espouse a pragmatic (albeit not a pragma-
dialectic) approach to argumentation also adhere to a model in which the effec-
tiveness of an argument is measured by its ability to bring about the end of a 
conflict. In his landmark essay on the fields of argument, Rowland (1982) said 
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that identifying and analyzing the goal of an argumentative exchange offers crit-
ics the best way to evaluate the effectiveness of that argument. By identifying 
the shared purpose of a group of arguers (who also share specialization in the 
same field), critics have a foundation to more accurately judge the effectiveness 
of a given set of arguments. Rowland (1985) posited that a pragmatic theory of 
argument in which criticism is centered on determining whether an argument is 
useful in fulfilling its rhetorical goals could function as a corrective to postmo-
dern criticisms of rationality. He claimed that all argument is essentially ration-
al, and its effectiveness can be gauged by its consequences, or whether or not it 
functions as a useful problem-solving tool (p. 354). Thus, Rowland maintained 
that ―the business of argument is problem-solving‖ (p. 356). 
In this essay, I argue that the pragma-dialectical approach to the analysis of 
argumentative discourse is limited, or could better serve critics if it provided a 
more defined method for the evaluation of arguments based upon goals, purpos-
es, and consequences. Specifically, I claim that pragma-dialectical methodology 
potentially runs the risk of amorality because arguments are deemed ‗good‘ as 
long as they meet the goals of the speaker, regardless of what those goals or 
purposes might be. In the following segments of this essay, I more clearly and 
specifically identify and investigate the aforementioned ethical deficiencies of 
the pragma-dialectical method. In addition, I outline a corrective based on the 
theories of American pragmatists such as John Dewey, William James, and Ri-
chard Rorty that I believe functions to elevate the pragma in this particular ap-
proach. To be clear, I am not advocating the wholesale abandonment of the 
pragma-dialectical approach; rather, I argue that a more philosophically robust 
theoretical foundation (and application) may offer critics a more useful, and in-
deed more ethical, method for interrogating argument. Finally, I argue that this 
type of investigation is particularly fitting for an issue dedicated to communica-
tion methodology and theory. As Craig (2007) noted, ―…many communication 
scholars have approached pragmatism as an epistemological-methodological 
stance without noticing that it also contributes a distinct way of theorizing com-
munication‖ (p. 133).  
 
Problems with Pragma-Dialectics 
Within the current framework, the dialectical portion of the pragma-
dialectical equation functions usefully, borrowing from ‗critical rationalism‘, 
and seeks to apply normative guidelines for what constitutes a reasonable dialo-
gue aimed at problem-solving. The theoretical emphasis on dialectic is well-
placed and closely resembles Habermasian notions of an ideal speech situation 
in which critical stasis is reached by all parties in the argumentative process as 
they moved toward public reconciliation of a dispute (Gilder, 1987, pp. 16-17). 
While I would argue that these types of ‗ideal‘ dialectical exchanges are rare and 
elusive, the guidelines applied by the pragma-dialectic approach nevertheless 
help to provide useful benchmarks for criticism. However, the way in which the 
pragma is applied in the current conception of the methodology is problematic, 
and potentially, it is ethically suspect. I argue that this dilemma primarily stems 
from a misapplication, or a lack of incorporation of pragmatism. To elucidate a 
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theoretical corrective to this methodological problem, it is first necessary to spe-
cifically identify my points of contention with the Amsterdam school.  
First, as Garver (2000) argued, not all discourse is about dispute resolution. 
Indeed, ―discourse often has purposes that have nothing to do with resolving 
disputes‖ and ―people often speak merely to be heard, to express themselves, 
and create identity within a community‖ (p. 307). The way in which the pragma-
dialectical method is currently applied offers no means to account for these 
types of arguments, despite its intended goal of providing a way to analyze and 
explicate such ‗everyday‘ exchanges between people. The adversarial and pur-
pose-driven focus of the methodology obscures consideration of these important 
communicative utterances because it conflates ‗discourse‘ and ‗argument‘. One 
might argue that the purpose in Garver‘s example is to create identity within a 
community. However, identity-creation is distinct from conflict resolution, or 
problem-solution, and it is also not amenable to ‗field‘ analysis. As Row-
land(1982) suggests, how would one evaluate these types of arguments based 
upon field dependence or field invariance? How would a critic even classify 
these types of arguments that clearly defy easy categorization? One might argue 
that ―identity creation‖ is a field or argument, but defining the parameters of that 
very broad field would be an enormous and theoretically impractical task.  
The basis for my second set of objections to the pragma-dialectical ap-
proach can be traced to the work of Perelman and Olbrechs-Tyteca (1969). They 
questioned the usefulness of a pragmatic conception of argumentation on two 
counts. First, they argued that ―pragmatic arguments can only be developed in 
terms of agreement on the value of consequences‖ (p. 268). How do people who 
already possess a different opinion on the substance of an issue come to agree-
ment upon the potential values associated with the consequences of action or 
inaction? The answer is that they would not come to such an agreement, were 
the exchange not taking place in an ideal dialectical situation. It is not particular-
ly pragmatic, even in its most ‗practical‘ sense, to assume that humans involved 
in a dispute with a predetermined difference of opinion would be able to would 
ever be able to approach such a rational place of argumentative ‗stasis‘ (Hinck 
and Rist, 1983). The use of this methodology would become even more limited 
if the argumentative dilemma were highly ideological, such as in contemporary 
debates over abortion policy. Second, Perelman and Olbrechs-Tyteca (1969) 
argued that multiple consequences may stem from a single event, or that unpre-
dictable, nascent, and perhaps invisible consequences may arise from an argu-
ment. Critics operating within the current application of pragma-dialectical me-
thodologies would be hard-pressed to account for an argument that was deemed 
‗effective‘ because it fulfilled the desired purpose, but also created unintended 
or dangerous consequences.  
A third line of exposition, also levied first by Perelman and Olbrechs-
Tyteca (1969), but distinct from the aforementioned criticisms, is that the evalu-
ation of argument(s) from a pragmatic, or purely consequentialist standpoint, 
might preclude a moral or ethical evaluation that might be more appropriate 
from a methodological standpoint. Indeed, Frank (2004) argued that pragma-
dialectics originated ―with a misreading of the New Rhetoric paradigm to launch 
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a system of argument with quite different goals than those set forth by Perel-
man‖ (p. 267-8). Put simply, the pragma-dialectical approach considers itself to 
be a universal method that offers a way to analyze all arguments; this is not the 
case because it rests upon the problematic ―presupposition of speech validity 
claims: that what the speaker says is true, sincere, and normatively appropriate‖ 
(Curato, 2008, p. 9). The pragma-dialectic method, as currently conceived, is 
limited at best because it provides critics with no way to reject or even interro-
gate arguments made in the service of less-than-noble goals or purposes.  
A fourth objection concerns the overwhelmingly rationalist assumptions 
behind the pragma-dialectical method. In Manifest Rationality, Johnson (2000) 
proclaimed that ―argumentation is characterized by manifest rationality‖ and 
that argument is ―patently and openly rational‖ (p. 163). I argue that it is both 
dangerous and fallacious to reduce all human argumentation into the realm of 
the rational. All discourse and argumentation is not rational, or even necessarily 
purpose-driven. As Williams (1993) claimed, ―the human has become literally 
disembodied in the discourses of modernism, abstracted into the logics of logic‖ 
(p. 86). Indeed, such an overbearing focus on rationalism dooms the pragma-
dialectic methodology to the realm of the useless for the analysis of some cate-
gories of rhetoric. For example, rhetorical arguments often appear in the form of 
aesthetics such as music, art, or other visual imagery. The arguments made in 
these venues are not dialectical in nature; they are not part of an explicit argu-
mentative exchange; they do not fit into the definition of an ―ideal speech situa-
tion‖; and they are not amenable to analysis based on fallacies. While the prag-
ma-dialectic method does not necessarily purport to explain all types of argu-
ments, I do believe that its applicability to the analysis of rhetorical arguments 
has been overstated.  
Finally, a fifth objection to the pragma-dialectical approach is that its notion 
of fallacies is too limited to be a useful tool for critics. If fallacies are simply 
defined as violations of the rules, or aberrations in the unattainable world of the 
ideal speech situation, is there room for any notion of the rhetorical enthymeme? 
For example, in a pragma-dialectic framework, an enthymematic argument (with 
a missing premise), would be viewed as a fallacy rather than as an argument in 
which the audience was intended to supply the missing warrants. Concurrently, 
within the current applications of the pragma-dialectical framework, any justifi-
cation or rhetorical strategy is deemed legitimate so long as it fulfills its purpose 
without violating the rules. As noted by Tindale (1999), ―the pragma-dialectical 
theory of argumentation effectively restricts fallacies to the violation of rules for 
conducting a critical discussion‖ (p. 49). Herein lies the core of my argument; 
the pragma-dialectical approach is too heavily weighted toward the dialectical. 
A deeper investigation of the pragma side of the formula is warranted. In fact, 
failure to re-investigate (and reinvigorate) this method may call into question its 
overall usefulness, particularly with regards to the pragma-dialectical approach 
to fallacies. The question remains, how can argument critics evaluate an argu-
ment based solely on its purpose or outcome? If the initial purpose or goal is 
morally and/or ethically bankrupt, can critics still determine that the arguments 
put forth to justify those goals were ‗good‘? I argue that a careful incorporation 
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of the ideas of the American pragmatists can help to correct these methodologi-
cal deficiencies while leaving the dialectical side of pragma-dialectics intact.  
 
Elevating the PRAGMA in the Pragma-Dialectical Method 
When William James argued that pragmatism was ―a method only,‖ he was 
also implying that pragmatism was concerned with the means and methods by 
which consequences, or argumentative outcomes, were brought about (1991, p. 
23). One can easily extrapolate from James‘ position and argue that if the pur-
pose of a rhetorical or dialectical exchange is morally wrong, then at least some 
of the arguments put forth will also be morally wrong (even if formally or in-
formally ‗valid‘ or effective). Rowland (1985) thus misjudged James as being 
unconcerned with the means by which certain rhetorical goals are achieved. 
James was not purely a consequentialist, nor was he wholly concerned with po-
litical or philosophical expediency, as some have suggested. James was not only 
concerned with outcomes, but also by the methods by which outcomes are pro-
duced.  
On the other hand, contemporary pragmatic and pragma-dialectical ap-
proaches veer dangerously close to an amoral ethical relativism. Rowland, while 
arguing in the tradition and spirit of Dewey that ―pragmatic theory involves the 
use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action‖ (1985, p. 360), centered his 
notion of argument evaluation on the concept of purpose, which seems to privi-
lege an answering of the ‗why‘ question to the exclusion of the more important 
questions of ‗how‘, and ‗to what ultimate end‘. Dewey and James both argued 
that pragmatism possesses emancipatory potential. However, contemporary ex-
planations of pragmatic and pragma-dialectic approaches allow for the advocacy 
of undemocratic goals, so long as that is the stated or implied purpose of the 
speaker. In this framework, moral and ethical decision-making practices have 
taken a back seat to the age-old goal of political expediency. Additionally, the 
pragma-dialectic approach seeks to put an end to conflict, to resolve differences 
of opinion, to adjourn deliberation, and to create univocality. Herein lies precise-
ly what Frank (2004) argued was fundamentally un-pragmatic about the pragma-
dialectic movement--it sought to circumscribe rhetorical exchange, rather than to 
expand it: ―pragma-dialectics, which is truly a crude form of conflict resolution, 
seeks to end difference of opinion through argument‖ (p. 279). Pragma-
dialectics, according to Frank (2004), privileged clarity and precision over inter-
pretation in the investigation of the impact of argument: ―Pragma-dialectics is 
intolerant to interpretation, and certainly to varied interpretation, and seeks clari-
ty in the face of a reality and experience that is irreducibly ambiguous, tragic, or 
in which there are multiple or incompatible truths‖ (p. 279).  
Rowland‘s dismissal of Rorty‘s ―interpretive pragmatism‖ was also prema-
ture. While Rorty denied any foundational conception of truth, he also attempted 
to de-link notions of ―good‖ from truth. Rorty was not an ethical relativist; in-
stead, he simply argued that some truths were better than others. For Rorty, it 
was simply good to believe in some ideas over other competing ideas. Rorty‘s 
pragmatism contained a moral element that was lost in Rowland‘s re-telling. 
Indeed, ―the pragmatist disengagement of rules for action from an a priori, ra-
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tionalist-based truth claim renders ethical rather than epistemological questions 
central‖ (Horne, 2001, p. 150). Rorty espoused that some truths were more use-
ful than others, but not necessarily that those truths spoke to ―the nature of 
things‖ (1991, p. 24). When Rowland argued that there was a ―performative 
contradiction‖ at the heart of postmodernism, he mistakenly assumed that Rorty 
and others used rational argument to support their own metaphysics. To the con-
trary, Rorty argued that:  
 
The pragmatist does not have a theory of truth, much less a relativistic one. 
As a partisan of solidarity, his account of the value of cooperative human 
inquiry has only an ethical base, not an epistemological or metaphysical 
one. Not having any epistemology, a fortiori, he does not have a relativistic 
one. (1991, p. 24)  
 
The charge of ethical relativism is one usually reserved for use against 
pragmatists by modernist or realist critics. In this case, it is the pragmatists (both 
Rowland and the Amsterdam School) who are guilty of ethical relativism. Both 
Rorty and Dewey embraced a form of ethnocentrism that viewed truth as con-
tingent, but recognized that some truths are more useful, more enduring, than 
others. When Rowland appropriated Dewey on this subject, arguing that prag-
matism is emancipatory, he sealed the contradiction in his own argument. How 
can arguments that support a purpose that runs counter to the promotion of free-
dom and liberation ever be pragmatic? Those arguments may be effective or 
practical or expedient in achieving that purpose, but certainly not pragmatic in 
the sense that I mean here.  
As critics, we should be skeptical regarding arguments put forth in the ser-
vice of nefarious, undemocratic, or dangerous purposes. Moreover, from a me-
thodological perspective, approaches that short-circuit public deliberation by 
prematurely resolving differences of opinion run the risk of deconstructing the 
communicative bridge that links metaphysics and human action (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 3-4). The scholarship of Kenneth Burke is also instructive here. While prag-
matism is certainly oriented toward the measuring of consequences for Burke, 
he was also concerned with the inclusion of a consideration of the motivation of 
the speaker. For Burke, ―the pragmatist featuring of agency seems well-
equipped to retain a personal ingredient in its circumference of motives‖ (1945, 
p. 283). Burke‘s theoretical privileging of the exploration of the links between 
purpose and action was necessary to uncover the motivations and the ideologies 
that inform the ways in which human agents go about formulating and enacting 
decisions. Incorporation of Burke‘s ideas into the application of pragmatic ap-
proaches to argument may begin to account for the types of dangerous public 
rhetoric I am concerned with in this essay.  
The goal of this essay is truly pragmatic in nature. It is aimed at providing 
critics with a way to analyze and investigate argumentation in terms of both its 
rhetorical and dialectical function. It is also pragmatic, in the American philo-
sophical sense, in that it seeks to yield a means by which scholars can more ac-
curately identify and criticize the types of undemocratic rhetoric that seems to 
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pervade the contemporary socio-political-linguistic milieu. I have argued here 
that the dialectical side of pragma-dialectics is useful and meaningful as it has 
been applied in contemporary argument criticisms. Pragma-dialectic theory is 
aimed at producing a set of normative guidelines that govern critical discussions 
between people who are trying to reach a consensus. What has remained unex-
plained thus far is the function of the connection between the pragmatic and the 
dialectical. In this framework, the pragma provides critics with a better way to 
investigate the rhetorical implications of argumentation. In the pragma-
dialectical framework as currently conceived and applied, it is easy to point to 
fallacies in which a participant violates one of the normative rules of dialectic, 
but it is less clear how critics should evaluate the rhetorical or persuasive ele-
ments of an argument. Certainly, evaluation based upon purpose, goals, or per-
ceived consequences is both incomplete and potentially dangerous. Perhaps 
Wenzel (1993) characterized it best when he indicated that ―argumentation pro-
duces habits of life and living, not formations of words…the art in rhetoric con-
sists in accomplishing persuasion in the best interest of a polity, not in discover-
ing the means of persuasion, as Aristotle claimed‖ (p. 3). While the pragmatic 
tradition in communication studies is certainly concerned with discovering the 
means (inventio) by which rhetorical goals are accomplished, it must be more 
willing to castigate and reject arguments which cannot have positive ramifica-
tions for civil society. For example, critics who analyze the rhetoric of those 
engaged in racist ―hate speech‖ must have an ideological, moral component as 
part of their methodology in order to identify and investigate the arguments ad-
vanced in support of the goals of those rhetors. In the current pragma-dialectical 
framework, such rhetoric might be criticized on dialectical grounds, but the me-
thodological spotlight on purpose and goal-fulfillment leaves critics with slight 
means to analyze the quality and/or validity of the arguments themselves.  
 
Conclusions 
In this essay, I have outlined a corrective to the pragma-dialectical method 
of evaluating argumentation. I have suggested, at least implicitly, some ways in 
which some of the tenets of American pragmatist philosophy might be incorpo-
rated post hoc into the discussion surrounding the most useful ways to engage in 
argument criticism. To be clear, I have at least suggested some theoretical start-
ing points that might move critics toward potential solutions to the criticisms 
laid out at the beginning of the essay. Since not all arguments are aimed at dis-
pute resolution, the suggested re-envisioning outlined here can provide scholars 
with a way to explore arguments based on other goals, such as self-expression or 
identity creation. Pragmatists believe that some purposes are better or more use-
ful than others, but to exclude arguments would be to engage in incomplete 
analysis. Similarly, a re-imagining of the pragma-dialectical in the ways I have 
suggested would also, at least partially, resolve Perelman‘s objection to prag-
matic argument based upon its presupposed exclusion of moral or ethical deter-
minants. Indeed, a more philosophically informed pragmatic method is the very 
moral framework that Perelman desired. The corrective I have outlined here also 
helps to avoid the epistemological pitfalls of an overly rationalist conception of 
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argumentation. A more pragmatic notion of purpose would not immediately 
reject arguments or stated goals that were viewed as irrational, but instead would 
seek to determine if those goals were useful and positive in terms of their impli-
cations for civil society. An enriched notion of pragma-dialectics would also 
offer scholars a more applicable way to analyze non-traditional arguments such 
as those made in music, film, and visual images.  
Finally, a more informed notion of the pragma would help to clear up the 
theoretical confusion surrounding the identification and analysis of fallacies. 
The pragma-dialectical approach is clear regarding fallacies of argument that 
occur in the dialectical realm, but it provides critics with limited guidance to 
evaluate rhetorical fallacies except for reverting back to the fulfillment of pur-
pose. Under the current methodological framework, rhetorical strategies that 
were coercive in nature would be deemed illegitimate only if: a) they actually 
failed to result in coercion, or b) they were evaluated in the dialectical frame. 
While I am not putting forth an entirely new definition of rhetorical fallacy, I am 
advocating for the rejection of methods that are not ultimately pragmatic or 
democratic in the philosophical sense. The ―repair and refurbishment‖ (first 
noted by Frank, 2004) that I have suggested, potentially offers critics an 
enriched moral and ethical calculus for determining the value (and validity) of 
rhetorical argumentation. As rhetorical critics we should certainly be concerned 
with the structures and forms of rhetoric, but not to the exclusion of nuanced 
investigation of the ethical dimensions of rhetoric. Method should be emancipa-
tory, and there is little value in attempting to remove value from our criticism. 
On the contrary, value-based ethical concerns regarding the uses of argument 
and the identification and rejection of undemocratic arguments (whether formal-
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